Author’s note: Given my impaired vision, writing these columns is a team effort involving my wife Dianna and good friend Prof. Tom Davis. Now and then Tom advises significant additions and amendments, as he did with this column, and I want to acknowledge them with notations in the text.
In1823 President James Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine that asserted any European interference in the Western Hemisphere would be considered a direct threat to the United States. Never fully enforced, it nevertheless became American policy well into the 20th century.
Somewhat related, at the outset of WWII, was Japan’s assertion of an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The war was a disaster for Japan’s desire for empire, but the post war years still gave it near dominance in the economic affairs of the region.
More closely related is China’s determination that East Asia is within its undisputed sphere of influence, and will not tolerate political or military interference in the region coming from Western powers. Frankly, given China’s status as the other great power in the world, it’s at least as rational a policy as was the Monroe Doctrine. But the 21st century is not the early 19th. The interdependent global market place can accommodate China’s assertion of its doctrine, but not its energetic enforcement. Still, it represents the frontier where military bravado and diplomatic maneuvering will be played out for decades to come.
Virulent anti-communist Americans need to get two things clear about this situation. First, China has no interest in expanding its borders, the Taiwan question excepted. However, it is intent on creating an economic empire that dominates as much of the world as it can. Second, there are relatively few communists in China. Marx, Lenin and Mao are historical realities having had an enormous effect on modern day China, the biggest of which was the failure of communism. The Communist Party in China exists now as a political oligarchy dedicated to the success of a state managed private/public market, heavily regulated, but making room for the right kind of entrepreneurs. Hints of democracy, of a sort, that have emerged in recent decades have been squelched by the one man rule of Xi, but I suspect that when he’s gone his policies will also drift into the background. Too many Chinese have traveled widely, experiencing the greater world, too many have received Western educations, too many have glimpsed a wider variety of views via the internet, and too many local politicians have experienced the power of local voices making their wants heard. It won’t lead to Western democracy, but it will lead to something far different from Xi’s way of doing things.
Things might have been different had Obama’s Trans Pacific Partnership been endorsed by Congress and the American public, but it wasn’t. Nationalist isolationism combined with labor union fears put a stop to it. Our nation has paid the price. Well, what’s done is done. We need to move on.
How? Darned if I know. I’m just an average informed onlooker speculating about these things. A few final thoughts. It seems to me it would be a good move to rejoin what’s left of the Trans Pacific Partnership. Keeping American naval forces where they are now sends a message, if nothing else. An expensive message it is, but it’s still the game the world likes to play, so there you are. Tom Davis points out that The Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.) is organized to form a more robust challenge to the Chinese intent of seaway domination. He also notes that India’s growing population, economic power and democratic government may soon have as great a world status as China. In other words, China is not free to do as it will outside its borders.
A presidential meeting on neutral territory would be a good thing, even if it delivered little more than a photo-op. Reengagement with trade negotiations is a must.
Most of all, Americans have to get used to the idea that China is not an enemy to overcome, but a powerful competitor to be met with open eyes seeking a mutually beneficial, but well-guarded, relationship. What we need to avoid is making the smaller nations of East Asia into economic pawns that destroy their lives while foreign investors make billions. It’s a moral imperative easy to state but hard to see through.
If experienced China hands read this, an unlikely event, they will no doubt smile condescendingly at such naive guesswork. Perhaps, but sometimes simple observations are not so wide of the mark.
Thank you. I now have a slightly better understanding of China.